所属单位：国际工商管理学院
主题：Pre-Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information-
报告人：李卓政 上海财经大学 助理教授
时间：2016-12-07 13:30 至 15:00
地点：国际工商管理学院106
报告人简介：We study several pre-communication protocols in a coordination game with incomplete information. Under decentralized decision making, we show that informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium, yet miscoordination arises with positive probabilities. Moreover, the equilibrium takes a partitional structure and messages are rank ordered, with higher messages becoming increasingly imprecise. Compared to centralized decision making (a mediator without commitment), decentralization leads to more informative communication when the miscoordination cost is high, and decentralization performs better when the miscoordination cost is neither too low nor too high. We also study the case in which the mediator is able to commit to a decision rule beforehand.
